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“’TIL DEATH DO THEM PART?”: ASSESSING 
THE PERMANENCE OF GOODRIDGE 
Michael T. Mullaly* 
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE. By Daniel R. 
Pinello. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2006. Pp. 213. 
Abstract: In America’s Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage, Daniel Pinello explores 
the social and political underpinnings of the controversy surrounding so-
called “gay” marriage. Pinello’s analysis is directed toward using the strug-
gle for marriage equality as an empirical basis for achieving a better un-
derstanding of how public policy derives from the interactions of citizens, 
interest groups, and government entities. This Book Review argues the 
importance to policy formation of a force Pinello tends to underempha-
size: the counter-majoritarian influence of constitutional law and judicial 
review. The significance of this factor is considered primarily in relation to 
state constitutional amendments that purport to “define” marriage as be-
ing strictly between one man and one woman. This Book Review con-
cludes that such amendments, by their nature, violate the Federal Equal 
Protection Clause. Separate consideration is given to the particular ille-
gitimacy and vulnerability of such an amendment in Massachusetts, where 
state constitutional jurisprudence requires equal marriage rights for same-
sex couples. 
Introduction 
 Amid the sea of “Let the People Vote!” placards, with strains of 
Amazing Grace, This Little Light of Mine, and Battle Hymn of the Republic 
ringing through the air, one might have guessed that a vigorous suffrage 
battle was underway.1 Yet this otherwise reasonable conclusion would 
have done nothing to explain the accompanying “No Special Rights for 
Sodomites” poster, to say nothing of the giant red “Jesus Is Lord” bal-
loon flying forty feet above Boston Common—at least until the threat of 
lightning brought it down.2 Then there was the opposition: less prob-
able agents of disenfranchisement could scarcely be imagined.3 Stand-
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2006–2007). 
1 See Blogging the ConCon, Bay Windows, July 12, 2006, http://tinyurl.com/y5gw4m 
[hereinafter Blogging the ConCon]. 
2 See id. 
3 See id. 
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ing across Beacon Street from the “Let the People Vote!” contingent, 
they sang spirituals and hymns and carried signs reading “What If We 
Had Voted on Loving v. Virginia?” and “No Discrimination in the Con-
stitution.”4 For all its apparent incongruity, this bizarre set of circum-
stances actually makes complete sense—but not until the illusoriness of 
the voting-rights dispute is exposed.5 
 Stripped of all such pretense, this was a demonstration about the 
civil rights of gays and lesbians and the role of the courts in defending 
them.6 The controversy was fueled, in particular, by the recognition of 
equal marriage rights for same-sex couples by the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court (SJC).7 Indeed, unfolding that day before the 
eyes of anyone who cared to see was a textbook demonstration of the 
practice, more rampant now than ever, of mobilizing the rhetoric of 
democracy to disguise unprincipled attacks on the independent judici-
ary.8 Whatever their intention, those assembled under the supposed 
banner of voting rights had gathered, in fact, to inveigh against a much-
embattled function of the courts—that of enabling minorities to exer-
cise their constitutional rights.9 
                                                                                                                      
4 Id. In Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court found statutes banning interracial mar-
riage “subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment” 
and, thus, unconstitutional. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). It is not difficult to imagine what the 
outcome of a popular vote on the issue would have been: at the time Loving was decided, 
seventy-two percent of Americans were opposed to interracial marriages and forty-eight 
percent went so far as to assert that such marriages should be criminally punishable. 
Daniel R. Pinello, America’s Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage 169 (2006). 
5 See Blogging the ConCon, supra note 1. The ostensible “disenfranchisement” derived 
not from restrictions upon who may vote, but rather from adherence to long-established 
constitutional restrictions on which issues are appropriately made the subject of a popular 
vote. See id. For instance, a sign on the “Let the People Vote!” side proclaimed: “Say ‘No’ to 
Judicial Tyranny! Say ‘Yes’ to the Democratic Process!!” Id. Another read: “No to Gay Mar-
riage: It’s Not About Civil Rights, It’s About Right and Wrong.” Id. 
6 See id. 
7 See supra note 5; see also Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 
(Mass. 2004); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968, 969 (Mass. 2003). 
8 See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 269 ( J.P. Mayer ed., George 
Lawrence trans., HarperCollins 2000) (1850) (“I am aware of a hidden tendency in the 
United States leading the people to diminish judicial power . . . . [S]ooner or later these 
innovations will have dire results and . . . it will be seen that by diminishing the magis-
trates’ independence, not judicial power only but the democratic republic itself has been 
attacked.”); Sandra Day O’Connor, Editorial, The Threat to Judicial Independence, Wall St. J., 
Sept. 27, 2006, at A18 (documenting an increase in populist animosity toward the judicial 
branch and in threats to its independence, and cautioning that both run counter to fun-
damental theories underlying American governance); see also supra note 5. 
9 See United States v. Caroline Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (citing McCulloch 
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428 (1819)) (“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular 
minorities . . . tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to 
 
2007] Assessing the Permanence of Goodridge 501 
 The day of these events, July 12, 2006, the Massachusetts General 
Court (the state legislature) was scheduled to hold a constitutional 
convention.10 Among the constitutional amendments slated for consid-
eration was one from the Massachusetts Family Institute (MFI) seeking 
statewide implementation of its narrow and exclusionary “definition” of 
civil marriage.11 If successful, this proposed amendment (“the initia-
tive”) would require that Massachusetts prospectively “define marriage 
only as the union of one man and one woman.”12 
 An amendment of this kind to a state constitution would hardly be 
unique.13 Already twenty-seven states have included language in their 
constitutions intended to exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage, 
beginning with Alaska in 1998.14 Yet there is no precedent for the adop-
                                                                                                                      
be relied upon to protect minorities [and] may call for a correspondingly more searching 
judicial inquiry.”); The Federalist No. 78, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano 
ed., 2001) (“This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution 
and the rights of individuals from . . . dangerous innovations in the government, and serious 
oppressions of the minor party in the community.”). 
10 Scott Helman, A Legislative Vote Hangs in the Balance, Boston Globe, July 12, 2006, at 
B1; see also Mass. Const. pt. II, ch. I, § I, art. I. In Massachusetts, a constitutional conven-
tion consists of the Senate and House of Representatives meeting in joint session to de-
termine whether proposed amendments to the constitution merit eventual placement on 
the ballot. Mass. Const. amend. art. XLVIII, Init., pt. IV, §§ 4, 5. 
11 Helman, supra note 10. The MFI formed VoteOnMarriage.org to advance its initia-
tive petition. Kris Mineau, Press Conference ( June 16, 2005), http://www.mafamily.org/ 
mineauremarks.htm [hereinafter Mineau Press Conference]. VoteOnMarriage.org is a 
Ballot Question Committee of the sort required by Article 48 of the Massachusetts Consti-
tution. See id. 
12 Initiative Petition for a Constitutional Amendment to Define Marriage, Massachu-
setts Initiative Petition 05-02 (2005), available at http://www.ago.state.ma.us/filelibrary/ 
petition05-02.rtf [hereinafter Initiative Petition 05-02] (“When recognizing marriages en-
tered into after the adoption of this amendment by the people, the Commonwealth and its 
political subdivisions shall define marriage only as the union of one man and one 
woman.”). 
13 See, e.g., Ohio Const. art. XV, § 11. 
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in 
or recognized by this state and its political subdivisions. This state and its po-
litical subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for relationships 
of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, 
significance or effect of marriage. 
Id. Ohio’s amendment is of a particularly pernicious sort; in addition to barring same-sex 
marriages from legal recognition, it also attempts to foreclose the possibility of statutorily 
enacted provisions for civil unions or domestic partnerships. Id. 
14 See Nat’l Gay & Lesbian Task Force, Anti-Gay Marriage Measures in the U.S. 
(2006), available at http://thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue_maps/Marriage_Map_ 
06_Nov.pdf [hereinafter Task Force, Marriage Map]; Chris L. Jenkins, Ban on Same-Sex 
Unions Added to Va. Constitution, Wash. Post, Nov. 8, 2006, at A46. The states are: Alabama, 
Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michi-
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tion of a constitutional amendment to prohibit same-sex marriage in a 
state whose highest court has found the denial of marriage equality to 
be unconstitutional.15 The potential for this situation to arise currently 
exists only in Massachusetts—the single American state to acknowledge 
same-sex couples’ constitutional entitlement to equal marriage rights.16 
                                                                                                                      
gan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
Task Force, Marriage Map, supra; Jenkins, supra. In Hawaii, the constitution was amended 
in 1998 to allow the legislature to prohibit same-sex marriages by statute, which it did later 
that year. See Task Force, Marriage Map, supra. Nebraska’s amendment was ruled uncon-
stitutional by a federal district court on the grounds that it abridged rights other than mar-
riage in such a way as to deny gays and lesbians the equal protection of the laws; the amend-
ment’s constitutionality, however, was affirmed on appeal. Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 
368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1002 (D. Neb. 2005), rev’d 455 F.3d 859, 868–69 (8th Cir. 2006). 
15 See Andrea Estes & Scott Helman, Legislature Again Blocks Bid to Ban Gay Marriage: 
Lawmakers Recess Without Voting on Constitutional Amendment, Boston Globe, Nov. 10, 2006, 
at A1 (noting that the Massachusetts Legislature appeared to have killed a proposed con-
stitutional amendment to limit marriage to opposite-sex couples); see also Opinions of the 
Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968, 969 (Mass. 2003). A constitutional amendment adopted in 
Hawaii in 1998 very nearly establishes such a precedent, however. Compare Haw. Const. 
art. I, § 23 (“The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex cou-
ples.”), and Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572-1 (2005) (“[T]he marriage contract . . . shall be only 
between a man and a woman . . . .”), with Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993) 
(Levinson, J., plurality opinion) (“On remand, in accordance with the ‘strict scrutiny’ 
standard, the burden will rest on [the State] to overcome the presumption that [a statu-
tory ban on same-sex marriage] is unconstitutional . . . .”). In 1993, a plurality of the Su-
preme Court of Hawaii held that a statutory ban on same-sex marriage “regulates access to 
the marital status and its concomitant rights and benefits on the basis of the applicants’ 
sex” and, therefore, “establishes a sex-based classification” which must survive strict-
scrutiny review in order to be ruled constitutional. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 64, 68. On remand, 
the trial court found that the State had failed to rebut the statute’s presumptive unconsti-
tutionality—a conclusion the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91–
1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996), aff’d 950 P.2d 1234, 1234 (Haw. 1997). 
In response, the Hawaii Legislature proposed a constitutional amendment intended to 
restore its authority to ban same-sex marriage. Haw. Const. art. I, § 23; Pinello, supra 
note 4, at 27. This proposed amendment appeared on the November 1998 ballot, where it 
received the approval of sixty-nine percent of voters. Pinello, supra note 4, at 27. 
16 Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 572; Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968, 969. The high 
courts of New Jersey and Vermont have each held that same-sex couples are entitled, as a 
matter of constitutional law, to the same rights heterosexual couples derive from marriage. 
Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 223, 224 (N.J. 2006); Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 867 
(Vt. 1999). Both courts, however, very deliberately exempt one particular marriage right 
from the otherwise broad sweep of their rulings—the simple right to have one’s putative 
marriage-equivalent actually called a marriage by the sovereign authority that established 
it. Lewis, 908 A.2d at 224; Baker, 744 A.2d at 867. Many find this difference significant and 
disturbing; others trivialize it. Compare Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 569 (“Because 
the proposed law by its express terms forbids same-sex couples entry into civil marriage, it 
continues to relegate same-sex couples to a different status.”), and Lewis, 908 A.2d at 226 
(Poritz, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“We must not underestimate the 
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 In Massachusetts, a proposed initiative amendment does not be-
come eligible for placement on the ballot until it obtains the support of 
not less than twenty-five percent of the General Court in each of two 
consecutive legislative sessions.17 Once on the ballot, the initiative must 
then receive a majority of the popular vote before it can operate to 
amend the state constitution.18 The July 12, 2006 constitutional conven-
tion was the first occasion on which the MFI initiative came before the 
legislature.19 The measure was widely expected to receive the support 
necessary to advance to the next session of the General Court.20 In-
stead, before a vote on the merits of the initiative could be taken, the 
convention decided by a simple majority vote to recess until November 
9, 2006.21 This outcome infuriated the MFI, for whom success on the 
merits would have required less than half of a simple majority.22 The ini-
tiative was sidelined again on November 9, when the convention voted 
to recess until the final day of the legislative session—January 2, 2007— 
rather than take a substantive vote on the measure.23 Because an initia-
tive expires unless it succeeds in the legislative session during which it is 
introduced, proponents and detractors of the MFI initiative alike be-
lieved that the November 9 convention had ensured the measure’s de-
mise.24 
                                                                                                                      
power of language. Labels set people apart as surely as physical separation on a bus or in 
school facilities. . . . By excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage, the State declares 
that it is legitimate to differentiate between their commitments and [those] of heterosex-
ual couples.”), with Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 572 n.1 (Sosman, J., dissenting) 
(“The insignificance of according a different name to the same thing has long been rec-
ognized: ‘What’s in a name? / That which we would call a rose / By any other name would 
smell as sweet . . . .’” (quoting William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, act 2, sc. 2)). 
17 Mass. Const. amend. art. XLVIII, Init., pt. IV, §§ 4, 5. To merit consideration by the 
General Court, an initiative must have been signed by a number of registered voters not 
less than three percent of the total number of votes cast in the preceding gubernatorial 
election. Id. § 2. 
18 Id. § 5. More precisely, the initiative is required to receive the support of both (1) a 
majority of voters who choose to vote on the initiative itself and (2) thirty percent of voters 
who cast a ballot generally. Id. 
19 Helman, supra note 10. 
20 Id.; see Mass. Const. amend. art. XLVIII, Init., pt. IV, §§ 4, 5. 
21 Andrea Estes & Russell Nichols, Lawmakers Delay Vote on Gay Marriage Measure, Bos-
ton Globe, July 13, 2006, at A1. 
22 Mass. Const. amend. art. XLVIII, Init., pt. IV, §§ 4, 5; Press Release, VoteOnMar-
riage.org, Legislature Stalls Vote on the People’s Amendment on Marriage Until Novem-
ber ( July 12, 2006), http://www.voteonmarriage.org/news.shtml#071206pr. 
23 Estes & Helman, supra note 15. 
24 See Hilsinger v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 444 N.E.2d 936, 938–39 (Mass. 1983) 
(“Not having received approval by one-fourth of the members of the [first] constitutional 
convention, [the initiative] became a nullity for the purposes of the next constitutional 
convention.”); Estes & Helman, supra note 15. 
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 Would it were so.25 On November 24, Governor Mitt Romney and 
the ten original signatories to the MFI’s initiative petition brought suit 
against Secretary of the Commonwealth William Galvin and Senate 
President Robert Travaglini.26 The plaintiffs sought, among other even 
more extraordinary forms of relief, a declaration that “the Marriage 
Initiative Amendment is a matter constitutionally required to be voted 
on by the joint session . . . and that such a vote is required to be on the 
merits of the initiative.”27 In a unanimous decision, the SJC correctly 
noted that it lacked “statutory authority to issue a declaratory judgment 
concerning the constitutionality of legislative action, or inaction, in this 
matter.”28 Yet the court, in uncharacteristically expansive dicta, pro-
ceeded to issue the practical equivalent of a declaratory judgment 
nonetheless: 
We conclude that, while the plaintiffs cannot obtain declara-
tory judgment or mandamus against the Legislature, and, 
therefore, the complaint must be dismissed, it is our obliga-
tion, in these circumstances, to restate what [the constitution] 
requires. 
 . . . . 
 . . . The members of the joint session have a constitutional 
duty to vote, by the yeas and nays, on the merits of all pend-
ing initiative amendments before recessing on January 2, 
2007 . . . .29 
                                                                                                                      
25 Editorial, A Shameful Reversal of Rights, Boston Globe, Jan. 3, 2007, at A10 (“[A] 
vote for the amendment is a vote to eliminate a civil right that is contained in the state 
Constitution—a shameful and perhaps unique reversal of the long forward march of civil 
rights . . . . Each such vote is, as Governor-elect Deval Patrick said yesterday, ‘irresponsible 
and wrong.’”). 
26 Complaint at 1, Doyle v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 858 N.E.2d 1090 (Mass. 2006) 
(No. SJ 2006–0486) [hereinafter Romney Complaint]; see also Initiative Petition 05-02, 
supra note 12. Plaintiffs sued in their individual capacities; Travaglini was sued principally 
in his capacity as Presiding Officer of the constitutional convention. See Romney Com-
plaint, at 1. 
27 Romney Complaint, supra note 26, at 7. Plaintiffs also requested writs of mandamus 
to compel Sen. Travaglini to hold a vote on the merits of the MFI initiative and, failing 
that, to compel Secretary Galvin to place the measure directly on the ballot. See id. at 7–8; 
Brief of the Plaintiffs, Doyle, 858 N.E.2d 1090 (No. SJC–09887), at 1–2. These requests were 
so plainly overreaching that counsel abandoned them at oral argument. See Doyle, 858 
N.E.2d at 1092 n.4. 
28 Doyle, 858 N.E.2d at 1095. 
29 Id. at 1092–93. The court did not merely lack statutory authority to issue a declara-
tory judgment—it was statutorily forbidden from doing so. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231A, 
§ 2 (2006) (“[T]his section shall not apply to the governor and council or the legislative 
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As a direct result of the SJC’s strongly-worded opinion, lawmakers at the 
January 2 constitutional convention decided to vote on the merits of 
the MFI amendment.30 As expected, the measure received the support 
of slightly more than twenty-five percent of legislators (passing 62 yeas 
to 134 nays) and thereby became cleared for consideration by the next 
General Court.31 
 Already twice the subject of litigation, the MFI initiative continues 
to raise elemental and largely unresolved questions of law.32 Should 
further legal challenges to the initiative be advanced, the central in-
quiry is likely to be whether the character of the proposed amendment 
is rights-stripping or merely definitional.33 If the former characteriza-
                                                                                                                      
and judicial departments.”). Moreover, the legal question posed by Doyle had already been 
litigated. See LIMITS v. President of the Senate, 604 N.E.2d 1307, 1308 (Mass. 1992). The com-
plaint in LIMITS properly was dismissed on two independent grounds: the statute immu-
nizing the legislature from declaratory judgments and the court’s prudential concern for 
the continued vitality of separation-of-powers principles. See id. at 1310. The gratuitous 
admonitions of the Doyle court are a disturbing contrast—particularly because they appear 
in an opinion that acknowledges, in spite of itself, that the constitution plausibly imposes 
no duty to vote on the substance of proposed initiative amendments. See 858 N.E.2d at 
1095–96 (“Some members of the General Court may have reasoned, in good faith, that a 
vote on the merits of the initiative amendment . . . was not required by the constitutional 
text . . . .”). The constitutional directive that “[f]inal legislative action in the joint session 
upon any amendment shall be taken only by call of the yeas and nays” could quite reasona-
bly be understood to specify only the manner in which final action must be taken if such 
action is taken at all. Compare Mass. Const. amend. art. XLVIII, Init., pt. IV, § 4 (mandating 
that proposed initiative amendments receive legislative approval before placement on the 
ballot) (emphasis added), with Mass. Const. amend. art. XLVIII, Init., pt. V, § 1 (allowing 
proposed initiative statutes not receiving the required legislative approval to appear on the 
ballot by other means). Doyle is not the mere restatement of the law it purports to be. Com-
pare 858 N.E.2d at 1092, with id. at 1093, 1096. 
30 Frank Phillips & Lisa Wangsness, Same-sex Marriage Ban Advances, Boston Globe, 
Jan. 3, 2007, at A1. 
31 Id. 
32 Doyle, 858 N.E.2d at 1092; Schulman v. Attorney Gen., 850 N.E.2d 505, 512–13 (Mass. 
2006) (Greaney, J., concurring). The issue in Schulman was whether the initiative related to 
“the reversal of a judicial decision” —a matter expressly barred from being made the subject 
of an initiative by that part of the constitution establishing the initiative procedure. 850 
N.E.2d at 506–07; see also Mass. Const. amend. art. XLVIII, Init., pt. II, § 2 (enumeration of 
excluded matters). The SJC held unanimously that this initiative would not operate to “re-
verse” a judicial decision but rather to “overrule” one. Schulman, 850 N.E.2d at 511. The ini-
tiative could not be a “reversal” because it made no provision for its own retroactive applica-
tion (i.e., for the nullification of existing same-sex marriages). See id. at 507 (“[P]rospective 
application . . . is fundamentally different.”). 
33 See Schulman, 850 N.E.2d at 513 n.3 (Greaney, J., concurring) (citing Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)). The opinions in Romer help illustrate the distinction between 
rights-stripping and wholly definitional enactments. Compare 517 U.S. at 633 (characteriz-
ing an anti-gay amendment to Colorado’s constitution as rights-stripping) (“A law declar-
ing that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to 
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tion is found to control, the courts would then have to determine 
whether the Massachusetts and Federal Constitutions each could abide, 
let alone compel, enforcement of a measure so antithetical to the pro-
tection of equality and fundamental rights.34 
 This Book Review attempts to resolve these constitutional ques-
tions. Part I examines Daniel Pinello’s America’s Struggle for Same-Sex 
Marriage and finds it to be neglectful of the courts’ role in ensuring that 
state constitutions do not become vehicles for discrimination.35 Part II 
defends judicial review, argues that the framers intended its potentially 
anti-majoritarian effect, and discusses how the MFI initiative threatens 
the integrity of the Massachusetts Constitution. Part III argues for the 
nullification, on federal equal protection grounds, of all state constitu-
tional provisions that abridge rights discriminatorily. 
I. An Indecent Proposal? 
 In America’s Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage, author Daniel Pinello 
chronicles the ensuing social and political controversies in five states 
where, through varied means and with widely differing outcomes, mar-
riage licenses have been issued to same-sex couples.36 For each featured 
state, Pinello constructs a separate narrative by juxtaposing related ex-
cerpts from his interviews with numerous, ideologically-diverse sub-
jects.37 The book profiles California,38 Massachusetts,39 New Mexico,40 
                                                                                                                      
seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most 
literal sense.”), with id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing the amendment as 
definitional) (“The constitutional amendment before us here is . . . a modest attempt . . . 
to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to 
revise those mores through use of the laws.”). 
34 See Schulman, 850 N.E.2d at 512–13 (Greaney, J., concurring). “If the initiative is ap-
proved by the Legislature and ultimately adopted, there will be time enough, if an appro-
priate lawsuit is brought, for this court to resolve the question whether our Constitution 
can be home to provisions that are apparently mutually inconsistent and irreconcilable.” 
Id. at 512; see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (majority opinion). 
35 See generally Pinello, supra note 4. 
36 See id. at 18–20. 
37 See id. at 21 (expressing author’s intention “to collect and to present . . . the unvar-
nished words of the people who lived them”). 
38 Id. at 73–101. On February 12, 2004, San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom an-
nounced his decision to instruct the San Francisco County Clerk to issue marriage licenses 
to same-sex couples. Id. at 73–74. Licenses were issued to 4037 same-sex couples during 
that so-called “Winter of Love” until March 11, when California Attorney General Bill 
Lockyer secured a judicial stay from the California Supreme Court. Id. at 74, 80. Later, in 
August, the high court also held that the California same-sex marriages were void from 
their inception. Lockyer v. City of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 498 (Cal. 2004). The court 
quite correctly identified the issuance of marriage licenses as a ministerial rather than a 
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discretionary duty. Id. at 472. The court also found that the relevant statutes confer no 
authority (ministerial or discretionary) upon a mayor with regard to marriage licensure; 
these powers are vested in county clerks and recorders alone. Id. at 471. Significantly, the 
court emphasized that the constitutionality of California’s statutory ban on same-sex mar-
riage was not a matter before the court and that the Lockyer decision therefore “is not in-
tended, and should not be interpreted, to reflect any view on that issue.” Id. at 464. 
In a fascinating coda to the Lockyer affair, the California Legislature, on September 6, 
2005, became the first in the United States to pass, without judicial prompting, a measure 
legalizing same-sex marriage. Assem. B. 849, 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005); Dean E. Mur-
phy, Same Sex Marriage Wins Vote in California, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 2005, at A14 [hereinafter 
Murphy, Marriage Wins Vote]. Some opponents of same-sex marriage unwittingly showcased 
the disingenuousness of their customary attacks against the judiciary by mobilizing the 
exact same arguments against what, one imagines, they might call “activist legislators.” See 
Murphy, Marriage Wins Vote, supra. Assemblyman Ray Haynes, for example, offered the 
following insight: “Engaging in social experimentation with our children is not the role of the 
legislature. . . . [W]e are gambling with the lives and future of generations not yet born.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger immediately vowed to veto the measure— 
and ultimately did so. California: No Same-Sex Marriages, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 2005, at A18. 
Schwarzenegger justified the veto by pointing to the fact that the marriage ban had been 
adopted by the people via Proposition 22 (an initiative that appeared on the 2000 California 
ballot)—and that it would therefore be unconstitutional for the legislature to permit same-
sex marriage absent a court decision or another popular vote. Cal. Prop. 22 (2000) (codified 
at Cal. Fam. Code § 308.5 (2006)) (“Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or 
recognized in California.”); Dean E. Murphy, Schwarzenegger to Veto Same-Sex Marriage Bill, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 8, 2005, at A18. Schwarzenegger’s claim is probably correct because Proposition 
22 does not contain a provision allowing for its unilateral amendment or repeal by the legis-
lature. See Cal. Const. art. II, § 10(c) (“The Legislature . . . may amend or repeal an initiative 
statute [solely] by another statute that becomes effective only when approved by the electors 
unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without their approval.”); Cal. 
Prop. 22 (2000). 
The main constitutional defense of the legislature’s attempt to establish same-sex mar-
riage without a prior popular vote is an argument that Proposition 22 concerned only 
whether California would recognize same-sex marriages established in other jurisdictions. 
Assem. B. 849 § 3(k), 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005). This strained reading of Proposition 
22 is plausible only because California amended its marriage statutes in 1977 to remove 
certain ambiguities that could have been construed to permit same-sex marriage. See 1977 
Cal. Stat. ch. 339, § 1 (codified in part at Cal. Fam. Code § 300 (2006)). As a result of 
these modifications, the establishment of same-sex marriages in California was already 
clearly prohibited at the time Proposition 22 was passed. Id. Arguably, then, the only pur-
pose of Proposition 22 was to ensure that same-sex marriages formed in other jurisdictions 
were not recognized in California. See id.; Cal. Prop. 22 (2000). Only on this decidedly 
counter-textual reading could Proposition 22 present no constitutional impediment to the 
establishment, by ordinary legislation, of marriage equality in California. See Cal. Const. 
art. II, § 10(c); Cal. Prop. 22 (2000). 
39 See Pinello, supra note 4, at 33–72. 
40 See id. at 1–17. Victoria Dunlap, clerk of Sandoval County, New Mexico, began issu-
ing same-sex marriage licenses on February 20, 2004. Id. at 1, 2. Constituents had re-
quested such licenses, and no one was able to demonstrate to Dunlap’s satisfaction that 
New Mexico law expressly forbade them. Id. at 1, 2–4. Sixty-four same-sex couples were 
issued licenses on February 20. Id. at 4. That same day, New Mexico Attorney General 
Patricia Madrid issued an expedited advisory letter asserting that New Mexico law re-
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New York,41 and Oregon,42 but among these and all other states, only 
Massachusetts has issued marriage licenses to same-sex couples state-
wide or for any appreciable length of time.43 
 The exceptional stability of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts is 
surely a result of the judicial (or, strictly speaking, constitutional) origin 
of marriage equality in that state.44 The great advantage of constitu-
tional litigation, in general, is its ability to shield fundamental rights 
from the vicissitudes of politics.45 So it was here: in Goodridge v. Depart-
                                                                                                                      
stricted marriage to “a man and a woman” and that same-sex marriage licenses ought not 
to have any legal effect. Id. at 16. Although the Sandoval County Commission voted to 
allow the same-sex couples married on February 20 to register their marriages with the 
clerk’s office, it also joined Attorney General Madrid in seeking (and obtaining) a restrain-
ing order to enjoin Dunlap from issuing additional same-sex marriage licenses. Id. The 
legal status of the New Mexico same-sex marriages remains uncertain. See id. 
41 See id. at 143–55. On February 27, 2004, Jason West, the Mayor of the Village of New 
Paltz, New York, presided over the marriage of twenty-four same-sex couples. Id. at 144. He 
felt it “crystal-clear” that New York law permitted same-sex marriage. Id. at 143. Within a 
week, West was criminally charged with solemnizing marriages without a license. Id. at 144. 
The District Attorney, having concluded that a trial would be inflammatory, dropped all 
charges against West in July 2005. Id. at 147. In July 2006, the Court of Appeals of New 
York effectively repudiated West’s interpretation of New York law governing marriage. See 
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 2006). The court ruled that New York statutes 
impliedly forbid same-sex marriage and that the state constitution does not require such 
marriages to be recognized. Id. at 5–6. 
42 See Pinello, supra note 4, at 102–42. Largely at the prompting of the gay rights or-
ganization Basic Rights Oregon, the Multnomah County Commission issued approximately 
3000 marriage licenses to same-sex couples during March and April 2004. Id. at 103, 105–
06. That November, Measure 36—a ballot initiative forbidding same-sex marriage by con-
stitutional amendment—passed by a margin of fifty-seven to forty-three. Or. Const. art. 
XV, § 5a; Pinello, supra note 4, at 102, 113, 123, 131. In April 2005, the Supreme Court of 
Oregon declared the same-sex marriages to have been void from their inception. Li v. 
Oregon, 110 P.3d 91, 102 (Or. 2005). The court invalidated the Oregon same-sex marriage 
licenses on the grounds that Multnomah County officials had lacked the authority to issue 
them. See id. at 91. The Li decision preceded, and was thus independent of, Measure 36. Id. 
43 See Pinello, supra note 4, at 19. See generally Li, 110 P.3d 91; Lockyer v. City of San 
Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004). Pinello acknowledges that the town clerk of Asbury 
Park, New Jersey issued marriage licenses to seven same-sex couples on March 8, 2004, but 
neglects to further discuss the circumstances surrounding these New Jersey licenses. 
Pinello, supra note 4, at 19. 
44 See, e.g., Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 571 (Mass. 2004). 
Here, the court emphasizes its function of shielding a minority’s rights from the antipathy 
of the majority: “The argument . . . that, apart from the legal process, society will still ac-
cord a lesser status to [same-sex] marriages is irrelevant. Courts define what is constitu-
tionally permissible . . . . That [anti-gay] prejudice exists is not a reason to insist on less 
than the Constitution requires.” Id. Recall that Opinions of the Justices itself resulted from a 
legislative attempt to forestall marriage equality. Id. at 566, 569; see also Pinello, supra note 
4, at 19, 186. 
45 See Complaint at 30, Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, No. 01-1647A, 2002 WL 
1299135 (Mass. Super. May 7, 2002), rev’d 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), available at http:// 
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ment of Public Health, the SJC held that “barring an individual from the 
protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because 
that person would marry a person of the same sex violates the Massa-
chusetts Constitution.”46 The order in Goodridge was stayed for 180 days 
to allow the legislature to enact corrective legislation independently, 
without further involvement by the court.47 Yet, at the time, most legis-
lators were disinclined to implement marriage equality unless abso-
lutely necessary.48 Within a month of the Goodridge decision, a bill enti-
tled “An Act Relative to Civil Unions” was brought before the Senate.49 
Its stated intention was “to give same-sex couples the opportunity to 
obtain the legal protections, benefits, rights and responsibilities associ-
ated with civil marriage, while preserving the traditional, historic na-
ture and meaning of the institution of civil marriage.”50 These dual ob-
jectives were to be accomplished by the creation of “civil unions” for 
same-sex couples, mirroring civil marriage in every way but name.51 
                                                                                                                      
www.glad.org/marriage/Goodridge/MAmarriagecomplaint.PDF (“The . . . practice of 
refusing same-sex couples the opportunity to apply for a marriage license is in violation of 
. . . their rights under the Declaration of Rights, articles I, VI, VII, X, XII and XVI, and Pt. 
II, c.1, sec. 1, art. 4, as amended, of the Massachusetts Constitution.”); see also Lockyer, 95 
P.3d at 485. 
46 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969. 
47 Id. at 970. 
48 See Pinello, supra note 4, at 45, 56. In March 2004, at a constitutional convention, 
the General Court voted 105 to 92 in favor of the Travaglini-Lees Amendment. Id. at 56. 
That Amendment, if successful, would have excluded same-sex couples from marriage and 
then established a separate legal status for them equivalent to marriage in everything but 
name. Id. Under Massachusetts law, a constitutional amendment is either an initiative 
amendment (introduced to the legislature by an initiative petition) or a legislative amend-
ment (introduced to the legislature by a Senator or Representative). Mass. Const. amend. 
art. XLVIII, Init., pt. IV, § 1. To succeed, a legislative amendment (of which the Travaglini-
Lees Amendment was one) must receive the votes of a majority of the General Court in 
each of two consecutive legislative sessions and then the majority of votes cast by the pub-
lic. Id. at §§ 4, 5; Pinello, supra note 4, at 55–56. Consistent with the above, the Travaglini-
Lees Amendment came before the next General Court at a constitutional convention held 
in September 2005. Pinello, supra note 4, at 71. Only then was the Amendment defeated, 
by a vote of 157 to 39. Id. The MFI initiative, unlike the Travaglini-Lees Amendment, in-
tentionally makes no provision for extending a parallel set of benefits (i.e., civil unions) to 
same-sex couples. Mineau Press Conference, supra note 11. Some of the votes against the 
Travaglini-Lees Amendment, particularly at the second convention, resulted not from 
support for same-sex marriage, but from opposition to extending any kind of benefits what-
soever to same-sex couples. See Pinello, supra note 4, at 182. 
49 See generally S.B. 2175, 183d Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2003). 
50 Id. § 1(g). 
51 Id. § 2. The tangible (i.e., not strictly dignitary, expressive, or symbolic) benefits and 
burdens of marriage identified by the court in Goodridge include: joint Massachusetts in-
come tax filing; automatic rights to inherit the property of an intestate spouse; the right to 
share the medical insurance policy of one’s spouse; equitable division of marital property 
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 The Senate admitted “grave doubt” as to whether the bill would 
satisfy the constitutional demands of Goodridge.52 Yet these doubts did 
not prompt the Senate to reject the constitutionally suspect measure.53 
Instead, demonstrating a predilection for minimal compliance with 
Goodridge, the Senate requested an advisory opinion as to the measure’s 
constitutionality from the Justices of the SJC.54 In Opinions of the Justices 
to the Senate, the court stated that the Senate’s proffered “civil union” 
scheme would be unconstitutional.55 The court found that the pro-
posal’s only purpose was to ensure reservation of the word “marriage” 
for heterosexual couples.56 Unable to imagine any legitimate state in-
terest that this form of discrimination rationally could be thought to 
advance, the SJC was constrained to conclude that the Senate proposal 
had been motivated by a naked desire to ascribe same-sex relationships 
an inferior status.57 The court’s insinuation that proponents of the bill 
sought only to legislate this prejudice was not subtle: “If . . . no message 
is conveyed by eschewing the word ‘marriage’ and replacing it with 
‘civil union’ for same-sex ‘spouses,’ we doubt that the attempt to cir-
cumvent [our] decision in Goodridge would be so purposeful.”58 
 Opinions of the Justices dispelled any lingering doubts as to whether 
marriage equality was required in Massachusetts as a matter of constitu-
                                                                                                                      
on divorce; temporary and permanent alimony rights; the right to bring claims for wrong-
ful death and loss of consortium; protection against having to testify against one’s spouse 
in certain circumstances; the right to direct the medical treatment of an incompetent or 
disabled spouse in the absence of a contradictory health care proxy; and the application of 
predictable rules of child custody, support, and removal out-of-state. 798 N.E.2d at 955–56. 
52 See S.B. 2176, 183d Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2003). 
53 See id. 
54 Id. In Massachusetts, each house of the legislature has the authority “to require the 
opinions of the justices of the supreme judicial court, upon important questions of law, 
and upon solemn occasions.” Mass. Const. pt. II, ch. III, art. II. 
55 Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004) (“The bill 
maintains an unconstitutional, inferior, and discriminatory status for same-sex couples 
. . . .”). Advisory opinions, it is important to acknowledge, “are . . . given by the justices as 
individuals . . . without the aid of arguments, are not adjudications by the court, and do 
not fall within the doctrine of stare decisis.” Commonwealth v. Welosky, 177 N.E. 656, 658 
(Mass. 1931). However, because (1) the majorities in Goodridge (which was not advisory) 
and Opinions of the Justices comprise exactly the same individuals and (2) the opinions de-
cide the same constitutional question, Opinions of the Justices should be entitled to unusual 
deference. See Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 571, 572 (indicating that the issue pre-
sented is equivalent to that in Goodridge); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948, 974. 
56 Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 571. “We recognize the efforts of the Senate to 
draft a bill in conformity with the Goodridge opinion. Yet the bill, as we read it, does noth-
ing to ‘preserve’ the civil marriage law, only its constitutional infirmity.” Id. at 569. 
57 See id. at 570. 
58 Id. 
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tional law.59 The result was a remarkable shift in the dynamics of the 
marriage debate in Massachusetts.60 Prior to Goodridge, civil rights activ-
ists carried the full burden of persuading legislators to enact measures 
for the recognition of same-sex couples.61 After Opinions of the Justices, 
by contrast, equal marriage was a legal certainty in Massachusetts—so 
much so that at least a constitutional amendment would be required to 
alter that result.62 Redressing this dramatic inversion of power is the 
admitted purpose of the MFI, and the MFI initiative is but its most re-
cent attempt to accomplish this goal by saddling the Massachusetts 
Constitution with discrimination.63 
 Pinello’s book attempts to distill, from numerous accounts of the 
same-sex marriage controversy, a better model of “how citizens, interest 
groups, and government interact to produce policy in America.”64 Not 
surprisingly, Pinello is quick to identify “the role and impact of courts in 
a democratic society” as a prominently recurring theme in his study.65 
He goes on, however, to identify “a conspicuous absence of consensus 
[among academics] whether American courts are important governing 
institutions with their own distinct power.”66 Pinello’s ultimate contribu-
tion to this debate is surprisingly tepid—particularly given his consistent 
praise for Goodridge.67 Indeed, he concludes only that his findings should 
“diminish the perception that courts are hollow hopes for significant 
social reform.”68 This clear understatement of the judicial capacity to 
correct social injustice is difficult to reconcile with the effusive sentence 
that immediately follows it: 
With nearly all other state and national policy makers at odds 
with its goal, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court none-
                                                                                                                      
59 See id. at 571, 572. 
60 Pinello, supra note 4, at 46. 
61 Id. at 45. 
62 See id. at 45–46. Even a constitutional amendment may not suffice, as there is sub-
stantial cause to doubt the validity of any amendment purporting, either expressly or by 
implication, to overrule Goodridge. See infra Part III. It is more definite that the SJC itself 
could halt prospective application of Goodridge, were it so inclined and a suitable case 
brought. See Schulman v. Attorney Gen., 850 N.E.2d 505, 508 (Mass. 2006). Yet the reliance 
of gays and lesbians on Goodridge is so substantial that principles of stare decisis alone make 
such a decision very unlikely. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992). 
63 See Mineau Press Conference, supra note 11. 
64 Pinello, supra note 4, at 156. 
65 Id. at 30–31. 
66 Id. at 30. 
67 See id. at 193. 
68 Id. 
512 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 27:499 
theless achieved singular success in expanding the ambit of 
who receives the benefits of getting married in America, in in-
spiring political elites elsewhere in the country to follow suit, 
and in mobilizing grass-roots supporters to entrench their le-
gal victory politically.69 
Pinello may have contemplated a more modest role for the judiciary 
because past court decisions recognizing marriage equality have had 
such unpleasant secondary effects—including a torrent of state consti-
tutional amendments and so-called “Defense of Marriage Acts.”70 The 
threat of popular backlash has, without doubt, delayed or otherwise 
tempered past efforts to litigate violations of gay rights.71 But such con-
cerns cannot alone explain Pinello’s reserved conclusion, particularly 
given his contention that the negative repercussions of Goodridge have 
been “relatively modest.”72 
 Inexact conceptions of the judicial task have led many—and per-
haps Pinello as well—to define too attenuated a role for the courts in 
the struggle for equal marriage.73 Pinello, for example, tends to portray 
courts as fully autonomous sources of public policy, neglecting to make 
clear that almost all policies “created” by the courts represent their at-
tempt to give effect to statutory provisions or, in the case of marriage 
equality, to constitutional constraints.74 The relevant distinction is be-
tween purposefully outcome-driven policymaking (which freely selects a 
given policy), on the one hand, and principled constitutional adjudica-
tion (which sometimes necessitates a given policy), on the other.75 One 
particularly clear mischaracterization of the judiciary as outcome-
driven occurs when Pinello asserts that the Goodridge court “achieved 
singular success . . . in inspiring political elites elsewhere in the country 
to follow suit [by issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples in their 
                                                                                                                      
69 Pinello, supra note 4, at 193. 
70 See id. at 32. 
71 See id. at 24–25. 
72 See id. at 180. 
73 Compare id. at 193 (discussing the success of the SJC in attaining a “goal”), with 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 966 (Mass. 2003) (“We owe great def-
erence to the Legislature to decide social and policy issues, but it is the traditional and settled 
role of the courts to decide constitutional issues.”) (emphasis added). 
74 See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 966 (“The Massachusetts Constitution requires that legisla-
tion meet certain criteria and not extend beyond certain limits. It is the function of courts to 
determine whether these criteria are met and whether these limits are exceeded.”); Pinello, 
supra note 4, at 30–31, 32, 33, 193. 
75 See supra note 73. 
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own jurisdictions]. . . .”76 To describe the behavior of these politicians 
as a “singular success” for the SJC is to play right into the hands of those 
waiting to pounce at the first hint of a supposed “activist” judge.77 
Pinello’s attribution of “success” here suggests that the Goodridge court 
had political motives when, in fact, there is no cause whatsoever to 
doubt that the only “goal” of the court was a faithful interpretation of 
the constitution.78 
 An additional consequence of this mistaken characterization be-
comes apparent in Pinello’s treatment of constitutional amendments 
purporting to forbid same-sex marriages.79 At no point, unfortunately, 
does Pinello discuss the possibility that such amendments are them-
selves vulnerable to legal challenge.80 Such a broad omission suggests 
that Goodridge has been treated more like ordinary public policy (e.g., 
equal marriage is desirable) than constitutional law (e.g., due process 
and equal protection require equal marriage).81 This is a dangerous er-
ror for Pinello and others to propagate—especially when the fate of 
                                                                                                                      
76 Pinello, supra note 4, at 193. Pinello is referring mainly to the municipal officials 
who issued marriage licenses to same-sex couples in San Francisco, Sandoval County (New 
Mexico), New Paltz (New York), and Multnomah County (Oregon). See id. at 18–20, 32. 
77 See id. at 32, 193; O’Connor, supra note 8. 
78 Compare Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 966 (asserting a basis in law), with Pinello, supra 
note 4, at 32, 193 (suggesting a basis in politics). The attribution here is especially im-
proper because many of the politicians whom Pinello discusses knowingly violated the 
marriage statutes in their respective jurisdictions. See Pinello, supra note 4, at 75–76 (ref-
erencing the refusal of San Francisco’s mayor to abide by an explicit same-sex marriage 
ban that, in his view, was unconstitutional). But see id. at 2–4 (relating how the Sandoval 
County clerk, upon finding that New Mexico law was silent on same-sex marriage, refused 
to prohibit such marriages). Municipal officials who adopt extralegal tactics undermine 
their own legitimacy and may even compromise more fundamental protections. See 
Lockyer v. City of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 463 (Cal. 2004) (emphasizing societal interest in 
“ensuring that public officials execute their official duties in a manner that respects the 
limits of the authority granted to them as officeholders”). As the California Supreme 
Court aptly notes, it remains inappropriate, post-Goodridge, for executive officials in other 
jurisdictions to make ad hoc declarations that state marriage laws are unconstitutional and 
not to be followed. See id. at 492 n.36. A legitimate use of Goodridge, by contrast, would be 
to file an analogous lawsuit in one’s jurisdiction and then argue that the local constitution, 
like the Massachusetts Constitution, compels the result reached in Goodridge. See id. at 485. 
79 See, e.g., Pinello, supra note 4, at 45–72 (discussing attempts to amend the Massa-
chusetts Constitution in response to Goodridge). 
80 See generally id. 
81 See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961 (“We conclude that the [same-sex] marriage ban 
does not meet the rational basis test for either due process or equal protection.”). 
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marriage equality itself may come to turn upon the legal viability of this 
disturbing new class of rights-stripping amendments.82 
II. Let the Justices Adjudicate! 
 Tension between courts and legislators, though perhaps brought 
to a new prominence by the same-sex marriage controversy, is neither 
unique to Massachusetts nor a recent development.83 This sort of fric-
tion has always been a predictable outcome of the judiciary’s legitimate 
protection of minority rights from undue abridgment by majority 
rule.84 Indeed, it would be decidedly odd were legislatures—beholden 
as they are, in theory, to democratic majorities—not regularly found 
arrayed against courts engaged in their potentially anti-majoritarian 
function of judicial review.85 Nonetheless, the recent inundation of our 
public discourse with accusations that “activist judges” and “elitist 
judges” are “legislat[ing] from the bench” remains a rather alarming 
                                                                                                                      
82 See Schulman v. Attorney Gen., 850 N.E.2d 505, 512 (Mass. 2006) (Greaney, J., con-
curring). If the MFI initiative succeeds in amending the Massachusetts Constitution, and 
the resulting amendment survives legal challenge, the consequences will be enormous: 
The . . . effect . . . will be to make same-sex couples, and their families, un-
equal to everyone else; this is discrimination in its rawest form. Our citizens 
would, in the future, be divided into at least three separate and unequal clas-
sifications: heterosexual couples who enjoy the right to marry; same-sex cou-
ples who were married before the passage of the amendment (but who, if di-
vorced, would not be permitted to remarry someone of the same sex); and 
same-sex couples who have never married and, barring the passage of an-
other constitutional amendment on the subject, will be forever denied that 
right. 
Id. 
83 See 102 Cong. Rec. 4459–60 (1956) (the “Southern Manifesto”) (“We regard the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court in the school [racial desegregation] cases as a clear abuse of 
judicial power. It climaxes a trend in the Federal Judiciary undertaking to legislate, in 
derogation of the authority of Congress, and to encroach upon the reserved rights of the 
States and the people.”). See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); 
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004). 
84 See The Federalist No. 51, supra note 9, at 332 ( James Madison or Alexander Ham-
ilton) (identifying the legislative branch as that most prone to abuse its power and advocat-
ing extensive structural precautions “to guard against [its] dangerous encroachments”). 
85 See The Federalist No. 52, supra note 9, at 337 ( James Madison or Alexander Ham-
ilton) (“As it is essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common 
interest with the people, so it is particularly essential that the [House of Representatives] 
should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people.”); 
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 78 (1980) (not-
ing diminished capacity of the political process to correct the unjust treatment of electoral 
minorities and the disenfranchised). 
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development.86 The trend is worrisome, in particular, because friction 
among the branches of government was created intentionally by the 
framers to establish structural protections of liberty.87 Courts assessing 
the constitutionality of legislation are performing their job, and today’s 
characterization of the separation of powers as an annoyance or usur-
pation for which the judiciary is to be blamed is a most unwise innova-
tion.88 
 Yet opponents of equal marriage find it expedient, and perhaps 
even necessary, to dismiss judicial review as though it were somehow a 
misappropriation of power by the nation’s courts.89 Goodridge itself has 
come to be held out as a paradigmatic example of judicial usurpation, 
with some of the most scathing criticism coming from dissenting Jus-
tices on the SJC.90 Indeed, the wholly imagined perils of Goodridge— 
including the destruction of democracy,91 marriage itself,92 and God’s 
                                                                                                                      
86 O’Connor, supra note 8. 
87 See The Federalist No. 51, supra note 9, at 331 ( James Madison or Alexander Ham-
ilton) (“[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the 
same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the neces-
sary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. . . . 
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”); O’Connor, supra note 8. 
88 O’Connor, supra note 8. 
89 See, e.g., President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address ( Jan. 20, 2004), 150 
Cong. Rec. H20, H23. President George W. Bush, for example, has mobilized such rheto-
ric to transform a discussion about the importance of marriage into one about the osten-
sible subversion of democracy by tyrannical judges: 
A strong America must also value the institution of marriage. . . . Activist 
judges . . . have begun redefining marriage by court order, without regard for 
the will of the people and their elected representatives. On an issue of such 
great consequence, the people's voice must be heard. If judges insist on forc-
ing their arbitrary will upon the people, the only alternative left to the people 
would be the constitutional [amendment] process. 
Id. 
90 See Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 574 (Mass. 2004) (Sos-
man, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is beyond the ability of . . . this court, no matter how activist it 
becomes in support of [same-sex marriage,] to confer . . . on same-sex ‘married’ couples 
. . . the entire package of benefits and obligations that being ‘married’ confers on oppo-
site-sex couples.”). It is shocking to find judges themselves, surely aware of the acute harm 
caused the judiciary and constitution, participating in the “judicial activist” smear cam-
paign. See O’Connor, supra note 8. 
91 See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 222 (N.J. 2006) (“Before the Legislature has been 
given the opportunity to act, the dissenters are willing to substitute their judicial definition 
of marriage for the statutory definition [and] for the definition that has reigned for centu-
ries . . . .”); Laura Mansnerus, Legislators Vote for Gay Unions in New Jersey, N.Y. Times, Dec. 
15, 2006, at A1. 
92 See Mel White, Religion Gone Bad 187 (2006). 
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natural order93—are so fanciful and outrageous that one not knowing 
better could mistake the SJC for a modern-day Star Chamber.94 Other 
attacks on judicial review are presented in a distinctly more moderated 
way, often evincing concern for the ability of overworked judges to 
make sound policy decisions.95 Here the danger of disingenuousness is 
extreme, as many speakers cynically adopt this tack simply to lend an 
underserved semblance of objectivity to their criticism of policies whose 
substance—not source—they find objectionable.96 
 In fairness, some objections to the judicial recognition of marriage 
equality are more misguided than cunning.97 For instance, one Pinello 
interviewee supports equal marriage in principle but takes offense at 
what she considers the unspoken message of the related litigation: that 
voters are not “smart enough or fair enough or wise enough” to extend 
such rights themselves at the polls.98 Though genuine, this viewpoint 
fails to appreciate the reason for—and effect of—the framers’ decision 
to temper our democracy with a written constitution.99 In America, nei-
                                                                                                                      
Most gays and lesbians do not want to marry each other. That would entangle 
them in all sorts of legal constraints. Who needs a lifetime commitment to one 
person? The intention here is to destroy marriage altogether. . . . Unless we act 
quickly the family as it has been known for five thousand years will be gone. 
With its demise will come chaos such as the world has never seen. 
Id. (omissions in original) (quoting Dr. James Dobson). 
93 See Pinello, supra note 4, at 158–59 (“[E]ven though [the court] can write a new 
definition for marriage, I say that marriage is a part of the moral law, that it was spoken 
into our very creation. . . . It goes right to the core of our understanding of scripture, of 
what’s good, of what’s right, and what’s best.”) (quoting interviewee). 
94 See Frederic W. Maitland & Francis C. Montague, A Sketch of English Legal 
History 118–19 ( James F. Colby ed., 1915) (describing the Star Chamber as “a political 
court and a cruel court, a court in which divines sought to impose their dogmas and their 
ritual upon a recalcitrant nation”). 
95 See, e.g., Pinello, supra note 4, at 172–73. Pinello interviewee Tim Nashif argues: 
“Legislators are sensitively going to listen to hearings and [the] people[] . . . . When an 
activist judge drops a gavel and says, this is the way it should be, he has no clear under-
standing of . . . how that choice is going to affect the economy, jobs, and society.” Id. 
96 See id. at 159. MFI’s Ronald Crews remarks: “What [the Goodridge] court did . . . over-
looked mountains of social science evidence, historical precedent, and the right of legisla-
tors to legislate. Instead, by fiat, the court created a social experiment . . . . What they’ve 
done is create—not homosexual marriage—but fatherless unions and motherless unions.” Id. (em-
phasis added); see also O’Connor, supra note 8 (“[E]lected officials routinely score cheap 
points by railing against the ‘elitist judges,’ who are purported to be out of touch with 
ordinary citizens and their values.”). 
97 See Pinello, supra note 4, at 134. 
98 Id. 
99 See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). Goodridge 
acknowledges the diversity, but also the legal irrelevance, of public opinion concerning the 
propriety of same-sex marriage: 
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ther the electorate itself (irrespective of how smart, fair, or wise it is) 
nor its representatives may define the substance or applicability of con-
stitutional rights by means of an ordinary vote.100 The people have the 
authority to advance marriage equality, but they certainly are not enti-
tled to withhold or impede it.101 More generally, it is both dangerous 
and incorrect to propose that asserting a constitutional claim impugns 
the intelligence, fairness, or wisdom of the people—litigation, in truth, 
advances the fundamental will of the people by enabling the judiciary 
to accomplish its constitutionally intended purpose of redressing legal 
injuries swiftly and justly.102 
                                                                                                                      
Many people hold deep-seated religious, moral, and ethical convictions that 
marriage should be limited to the union of one man and one woman, and that 
homosexual conduct is immoral. Many hold equally strong religious, moral, 
and ethical convictions that same-sex couples are entitled to be married, and 
that homosexual persons should be treated no differently than their heterosex-
ual neighbors. Neither view answers the question before us. Our concern is with the 
Massachusetts Constitution as a charter of governance for every person prop-
erly within its reach. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
100 See U.S. Const. art. V; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 
(1803). 
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, 
such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, 
is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise 
of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it, to be fre-
quently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established, are deemed funda-
mental, and as the authority, from which they proceed, is supreme, and can sel-
dom act, they are designed to be permanent. 
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176. The framers’ insistence upon an independent judiciary 
provides further evidence that the purpose of a constitution was, in their view, to shield the 
provisions contained therein from public sentiment. See The Federalist No. 78, supra 
note 9, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton) (“If . . . the courts of justice are to be considered as 
the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration 
will afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices [to permit the] 
independent spirit . . . essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty.”). 
101 See Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Mass. 2004) (“[Equal 
marriage] is not a matter of social policy but of constitutional interpretation.”). Here, the 
court is criticizing not the substance of popular opinion but the notion that it is, at all times, 
a relevant and appropriate consideration. See id. The infirm practice of measuring constitu-
tional law against popular opinion necessarily subordinates the former to the latter, giving 
rise to a false and dangerous sense of entitlement among voters to decide who is entitled to 
what fundamental rights. See, e.g., Pinello, supra note 4, at 134 (quoting voter offended by 
reliance on courts for the acknowledgment and defense of gay rights). 
102 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (requiring case or controversy as a prerequisite to adju-
dication); see also James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assess-
ments, Address Before the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia ( June 20, 
1785), in 2 The Writings of James Madison 185–86 (Gaillard Hunt ed., Putnam 1901). 
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 Goodridge and Opinions of the Justices held that no legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose is advanced by the exclusion of same-sex couples 
from marriage.103 Rarely is a direct response made to this controlling 
legal argument, as the inquiry tends to be diverted to the entirely sepa-
rate question of what governmental interests are furthered by “hetero-
sexual” marriage.104 The social utility of heterosexual marriage, however 
substantial, is inapposite for the simple reason that same-sex marriages 
are intended to exist alongside opposite-sex marriages—not to replace 
them.105 While a great number of legitimate state interests are surely 
achieved by permitting heterosexual couples to marry,106 the desirabil-
ity of heterosexual marriage, standing alone, provides no justification at 
all for barring same-sex couples from marriage.107 Indeed, it suggests 
that the state is likely to have an analogous interest in encouraging same-
sex couples to marry.108 Thus, recognizing that no rational reason exists 
                                                                                                                      
[I]t is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. We hold this 
prudent jealousy to be the first duty of Citizens, and one of the noblest charac-
teristics of the late Revolution. The free men of America did not wait till 
usurped power had strengthened itself by exercise, and entangled the question 
in precedents. They saw all the consequences in the principle, and they avoided 
the consequences by denying the principle. 
Madison, supra, at 185–86. 
103 See Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 570 (“[N]either may the government, un-
der the guise of protecting ‘traditional’ values, even if they be the traditional values of the 
majority, enshrine in law an invidious discrimination that our Constitution . . . forbids.”). 
104 See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 995 (Mass. 2003) 
(Cordy, J., dissenting). When the lead dissent in Opinions of the Justices attempts to rational-
ize the exclusion, it can only lamely propose that Massachusetts may wish to call its same-sex 
unions something other than “marriages” to avoid confusing other jurisdictions. See 802 
N.E.2d at 575–76 (Sosman, J., dissenting). 
105 See Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 569; Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 965, 969. 
106 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 995 (Cordy, J., dissenting). The encouragement of a stable 
family environment in which potential children could be raised tends to be the strongest 
governmental interest cited. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006). 
107 See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 965, 968. 
108 Id. at 965; Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 32 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). 
The State plainly has a legitimate interest in the welfare of children, but exclud-
ing same-sex couples from marriage in no way furthers this interest. In fact, it 
undermines it. Civil marriage provides tangible legal protections and economic 
benefits to married couples and their children, and tens of thousands of chil-
dren are currently being raised by same-sex couples in New York. Depriving 
these children of the benefits and protections available to the children of oppo-
site-sex couples is antithetical to their welfare . . . . The State’s interest in a stable 
society is rationally advanced when families are established and remain intact ir-
respective of the gender of the spouses. 
Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 32 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). 
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for excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage, the SJC acted 
squarely within the scope of its authority in Goodridge and, in fact, would 
have been remiss had it decided the case differently or fashioned the 
remedy less completely.109 
 Now, however, the MFI initiative is poised to riddle the Massachu-
setts Constitution with alarming and ungainly contradictions.110 The 
venerable and elegant constitutional guarantees of due process and 
equal protection would be precisely and designedly countervailed by 
operation of the theoretically degenerate MFI initiative.111 Nor could 
the irreconcilability be any more sweeping or fundamental.112 Given 
the constitutional holdings in Goodridge and Opinions of the Justices, it is 
now a legal certainty that any enforcement of the MFI amendment 
would require nothing short of suspending the due process and equal 
protection guarantees of same-sex couples unjustly denied the right to 
wed.113 As one SJC Justice notes, 
There is no Massachusetts precedent discussing, or deciding, 
whether the initiative procedure may be used to add a consti-
tutional provision that purposefully discriminates against an 
oppressed and disfavored minority of our citizens in direct 
contravention of the principles of liberty and equality pro-
tected by . . . the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.114 
Fortunately, Massachusetts and federal law together provide the tools 
needed to vindicate our storied traditions of due process and equal 
protection and, thus, to thwart the MFI’s perverse effort to turn the 
Massachusetts Constitution against the liberty, freedom, and dignity of 
those who need its protections most.115 
                                                                                                                      
109 See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 966 (“To label the court’s role as usurping that of the 
Legislature . . . is to misunderstand the nature and purpose of judicial review.”). Compare 
id., with Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 224 (N.J. 2006) (civil unions sufficient), and Baker v. 
Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) (civil unions sufficient). 
110 Schulman v. Attorney Gen., 850 N.E.2d 505, 512–13 (Mass. 2006) (Greaney, J., con-
curring). 
111 See id. at 512. 
112 See id. 
113 See Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004); Good-
ridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968. 
114 Schulman, 850 N.E.2d at 512 (Greaney, J., concurring). 
115 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996); Schulman, 850 N.E.2d at 513 n.3 
(Greaney, J., concurring). 
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III. Keeping State Constitutions Constitutional 
 There is, perhaps, no better indication of how wildly specious the 
MFI’s siren song is than what happened the last time a state simply “let 
the people vote” on whether to eviscerate the civil rights of gays and 
lesbians.116 In 1992, the people of Colorado amended the state consti-
tution through a referendum (“Amendment 2”) to require that: 
Neither the State of Colorado . . . nor any of its . . . political 
subdivisions . . . shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regu-
lation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bi-
sexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall 
constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or 
class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota 
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.117 
Amendment 2 was immediately challenged on equal protection 
grounds.118 The Colorado Supreme Court determined that the meas-
ure burdened a fundamental right—namely, that of equal participation 
in the political process—and thus applied strict scrutiny.119 The court 
then proceeded to hold Amendment 2 unconstitutional, finding that it 
furthered no “compelling governmental interest in a narrowly tailored 
way.”120 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld this outcome, but on substan-
tially different grounds.121 In particular, the Court did not subject the 
measure to strict scrutiny.122 Instead, it ruled that Amendment 2 could 
not withstand even the exceedingly deferential “rational basis” test—a 
conclusion that obviated any need to engage in a separate strict scru-
tiny analysis.123 
                                                                                                                      
116 See U.S. Const art. VI; U.S. Const amend. XIV, § 1; Romer, 517 U.S. at 631–32. 
117 Romer, 517 U.S. at 624. 
118 Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1339 (Colo. 1994), aff’d on other grounds, 517 U.S. at 
626. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 1350. Colorado argued that Amendment 2 was essential to “deterring faction-
alism;” “preserving the integrity of the state's political functions;” “preserving the ability of 
the state to remedy discrimination against suspect classes;” “preventing the government 
from interfering with personal, familial, and religious privacy;” “preventing government 
from subsidizing the political objectives of a special interest group;” and “promoting the 
physical and psychological well-being of Colorado children.” Id. at 1339–40. 
121 Romer, 517 U.S. at 626. 
122 Id. at 635. 
123 Id. at 632. The rational basis test is summarized as follows: “[I]f a law neither bur-
dens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, [the Court] will uphold the legislative 
classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.” Id. at 631. Note 
that the dissent in Romer incorrectly insinuates that use of the rational basis test may be 
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 Despite the Court’s application of the most deferential standard of 
review, its scrutinization of the Colorado amendment was rigorous and 
evinced particular dissatisfaction with the measure’s brazenly malicious 
purpose: 
Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, [rational basis] inquiry. 
First, the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a 
broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named 
group, an exceptional and, as we shall explain, invalid form of 
legislation. Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with 
the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexpli-
cable by anything but animus toward the class it affects . . . .124 
In order to appreciate why the Court relegates Amendment 2 to an “in-
valid” class of legislation, one must understand what kind of “broad and 
undifferentiated disability” the Colorado amendment intended to per-
petrate upon gays and lesbians.125 Defenders of Amendment 2 contend 
that the measure sought only to prevent gays and lesbians from procur-
ing “special treatment” and would be limited in effect to keeping them 
“in the same position as all other persons.”126 But, as the Court rightly 
observed, 
Amendment 2’s reach may not be limited to specific laws passed 
for the benefit of gays and lesbians. It is a fair, if not necessary, in-
ference from the broad language of the amendment that it 
deprives gays and lesbians even of the protection of general 
laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in gov-
ernmental and private settings.127 
Thus Romer, at a minimum, may be relied upon for the proposition that 
it is unconstitutional to withhold the general benefits and protections 
of the law from a group based solely upon that group’s unpopularity 
among the electorate.128 This aspect of Romer critically undermines 
                                                                                                                      
taken as evidence that no fundamental rights are at issue. See id. at 650 n.3 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). 
124 Id. at 632 (majority opinion); see also supra note 120. 
125 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
126 Id. at 637, 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
127 Id. at 630 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
128 Id. at 635. Discrimination of this kind violates the Equal Protection clause: 
Central both to the idea of rule of law and to our own Constitution’s guarantee 
of equal protection is the principle that government and each of its parts re-
main open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance. . . . Respect for this 
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state constitutional amendments seeking to prohibit same-sex mar-
riage.129 Proving the vulnerability of these amendments requires both 
(1) demonstrating their essential similarity to Amendment 2 in Colo-
rado and (2) explicating the theoretical underpinnings of the Romer 
Court’s assertion, concerning Amendment 2, that “[i]t is not within our 
constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort.”130 
 In Massachusetts, where marriage equality is required by law, it is 
undeniable that a constitutional amendment purporting to define mar-
riage strictly as the union of one man and one woman is nothing but a 
particularized version of Colorado’s Amendment 2.131 Opinions of the 
Justices definitively established that civil marriage is a benefit that de-
rives from universally applicable state law.132 The availability of same-sex 
marriage is therefore most emphatically not a “special benefit” con-
ferred upon gays and lesbians.133 Accordingly, any constitutional provi-
sion that aims to “define” marriage in a manner that excludes same-sex 
couples per se strips gays and lesbians of a fundamental right the law 
itself makes generally available.134 That such is the precise objective of 
those who promote amendments of this unprincipled variety is made 
wholly apparent by their otherwise inexplicable insistence upon and 
obsession with modifying constitutions.135 Few people, until recently, 
would have ever regarded state constitutions as sensible or even vaguely 
appropriate repositories for supposed family law “definitions.”136 
 Looking beyond Massachusetts, it is essential to remember that the 
failure of all other states to acknowledge the marriage rights of same-
sex couples does nothing to prove that there are no such yet-to-be rec-
                                                                                                                      
principle explains why laws singling out a certain class of citizens for disfavored 
legal status or general hardships are rare. 
Id. at 633. 
129 See Schulman v. Attorney Gen., 850 N.E.2d 505, 513 n.3 (Mass. 2006) (Greaney, J., 
concurring) (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 633). 
130 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. 
131 See Schulman, 850 N.E.2d at 513 n.3 (Greaney, J., concurring). 
132 Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Mass. 2004). 
133 See id. 
134 See Schulman, 850 N.E.2d at 512 (Greaney, J., concurring). 
135 See id. 
136 See Ely, supra note 85, at 88 (quoting Lon Fuller). Note that the purported “defini-
tions” of marriage advanced by those who assert a need to “protect” that institution from 
the inclusion of same-sex couples tend to be far more illustrative of anti-gay prejudice than 
of the attributes of marriage itself. Note, Litigating the Defense of Marriage Act: The Next Bat-
tleground for Same-Sex Marriage, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2684, 2700–01 (2004) (“The [Federal 
Defense of Marriage] Act ‘defines’ marriage only so far as to say that it is something that 
same-sex couples cannot have. The singling-out function of this exclusionary definition is 
quite similar to the effect of Colorado’s Amendment 2 . . . .”). 
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ognized constitutional entitlements elsewhere.137 The obvious-yet-
profound corollary of this observation is that provisions claiming to 
ban same-sex marriage are rights-stripping in all jurisdictions where the 
underlying right to equal marriage itself exists—regardless of whether 
that right is formally acknowledged.138 Moreover, because American 
constitutional law regards marriage as a fundamental (and therefore 
universal) right, the discrimination inherent in these anti-gay provi-
sions very directly implicates the protections extended by the Court in 
Romer.139 
 Two interrelated standards should guide any assessment of a law’s 
legitimacy: (1) electoral vulnerability and (2) general applicability.140 In 
the absence of either, the likelihood that the enactment in question is, 
as the Supreme Court concluded in Romer, “not within our constitu-
tional tradition” is substantially increased.141 Electoral vulnerability is pre-
sent when those significantly burdened by a particular piece of legisla-
tion possess, in the aggregate, enough influence to exert a 
correspondingly substantial effect upon the composition of the legisla-
ture.142 This structural protection of liberty, despite its immense power, 
can do nothing to protect fundamental rights the democratic majority 
                                                                                                                      
137 See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 34 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting); see also 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003), rev’g Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
138 See Schulman, 850 N.E.2d 512, 513 & n.3 (Greaney, J., concurring). An unacknow-
ledged right to equal marriage very plausibly exists throughout the United States on ac-
count of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see Schulman, 850 N.E.2d at 512, 513 & n.3 (Greaney, J., con-
curring); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 959 (Mass. 2003). 
139 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 630 (1996); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 
(1967). The U.S. Supreme Court discusses same-sex marriage throughout Lawrence, almost 
certainly in response to Justice Scalia’s argument that the majority’s holding eviscerates the 
supposed legal basis upon which equal marriage can be forbidden. See 539 U.S. at 604–05 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Writing alone, Justice O’Connor suggests arguments for the consti-
tutionality of same-sex marriage bans that would, in her view, survive the majority’s hold-
ing. Id. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Interestingly, however, the majority never at-
tempts to refute Justice Scalia’s assertion that its decision lays the foundation for a 
constitutional imperative that same-sex marriage be recognized. Compare id. at 578 (major-
ity opinion) (saying only that “[t]he present case . . . does not involve whether the gov-
ernment must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to 
enter”), with id. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (directly contesting Justice Scalia’s 
claim). 
140 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428 (1819). 
141 Romer, 517 U.S. 633; see Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) 
( Jackson, J., concurring); McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 431. 
142 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 428 (“The only security against the abuse of 
[the taxation] power, is found in the structure of government itself. In imposing a tax, the 
legislature acts upon its constituents.”). 
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regards with indifference or hostility—an important argument for judi-
cial review.143 General applicability, on the other hand, is present when a 
law makes no arbitrary or improper distinctions in its distribution of 
benefits and burdens.144 This precept, without which there could be no 
meaningful legislative accountability, relies substantially upon the Equal 
Protection Clause for enforcement: 
Invocation of the equal protection clause . . . does not disable 
any governmental body from dealing with the subject at hand. 
It merely means that the prohibition or regulation must have 
a broader impact. . . . The framers of the Constitution knew, 
that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbi-
trary and unreasonable government than to require that the 
principles of law which officials would impose upon a minor-
ity must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the 
door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials 
to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legisla-
tion and thus escape the political retribution that might be 
visited upon them if larger numbers were affected.145 
Most Western philosophy reflects essentially the same view, finding jus-
tice to reside in general principles from which no one is exempt.146 
                                                                                                                      
143 See United States v. Caroline Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938); Ely, supra 
note 85, at 78 (“What the [political] system . . . does not ensure is the effective protection 
of minorities whose interests differ from most of the rest of us. For if it is not the ‘many’ 
who are being treated unreasonably but rather only some minority, the situation will not 
be so comfortably amenable to political correction.”). 
144 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879; Ry. Express Agency, 336 U.S. at 112, 113 ( Jackson, J., con-
curring); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8–9 
(1967). 
145 Ry. Express Agency, 336 U.S. at 112 ( Jackson, J., concurring). 
146 See, e.g., Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, in 
Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works 1, 19–20 (Thomas Kingsmill 
Abbott ed. & trans., London, Longmans, Green, & Co., rev. 4th ed. 1899) (1785) (“I do 
not, therefore, need any far-reaching penetration to discern what I have to do in order 
that my will may be morally good. . . . I only ask myself: Canst thou also will that thy maxim 
should be a universal law? If not, then it must be rejected . . . .”); see also John Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice 12 (1971). 
Among the essential features of the [original position] is that no one knows 
his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know 
his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, 
strength, and the like. . . . [T]he parties do not know their conceptions of the 
good or their special psychological propensities. The principles of justice are 
chosen behind a veil of ignorance. . . . [A]ll are similarly situated and no one 
is able to design principles to favor his particular condition . . . . 
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 Constitutional amendments obstructing same-sex marriage are not 
generally applicable in any meaningful sense.147 Nor have they proven 
susceptible to correction by ordinary political processes; such measures 
instead have spread like a contagion and now defile the constitutions of 
more than half of all American states.148 Only in Arizona have voters 
arguably defeated an amendment of this kind on the ballot.149 By con-
trast, in Mississippi, a constitutional provision opposing marriage equal-
ity captured the support of an astonishing eighty-six percent of voters in 
2004.150 Statistics this dismal suggest that equal protection challenges to 
such enactments may be as strategically necessary as they are legally 
meritorious.151 
 An amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution seeking to end 
marriage equality could not withstand an equal protection challenge 
modeled after that in Romer.152 Indeed, the parallels between Romer and 
Goodridge are striking.153 Romer concludes: “Amendment 2 classifies ho-
mosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them un-
equal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so 
deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.”154 Goodridge condemns 
discriminatory marriage policies on exactly the same grounds and, also 
                                                                                                                      
Rawls, supra, at 12. 
147 See Schulman v. Attorney Gen., 850 N.E.2d 505, 512, 513 & n.3 (Mass. 2006) (Greaney, 
J., concurring). These amendments are generally applicable only insofar as they forbid both 
heterosexuals and homosexuals from marrying someone of the same sex. See Hernandez v. 
Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 20 (N.Y. 2006) (Graffeo, J., concurring). Reliance upon such obviously 
contrived constructions, however, is both disingenuous and insulting. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“To say the issue [at stake is] simply the right to engage in certain 
sexual conduct demeans the claim . . . put forward, just as it would demean a married couple 
were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.”). 
148 See Task Force, Marriage Map, supra note 14; Jenkins, supra note 14. 
149 Jenkins, supra note 14. The defeated Arizona measure sought to ban civil unions as 
well, which may have caused its failure. See Ariz. Prop. 107 (2006), available at http://www. 
azsos.gov/election/2006/Info/PubPamphlet/english/Prop107.pdf. 
150 Pinello, supra note 4, at 102. 
151 See United States v. Caroline Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938). To be clear, 
the enmity of the majority does not itself confer constitutional status upon an asserted “mi-
nority” right, just as popular support for a constitutional right does not strip it of its consti-
tutional status. See id. This in no way conflicts with the proposition that laws tending to 
suggest “prejudice . . . against discrete and insular minorities” are more likely to abrogate 
constitutional rights. See id. 
152 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); Schulman v. Attorney Gen., 850 
N.E.2d 505, 513 n.3 (Mass. 2006) (Greaney, J., concurring). 
153 Compare Romer, 517 U.S. at 635, with Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 
941, 968 (Mass. 2003). 
154 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. 
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like Romer, declares that laws grounded in animus can never rationally 
advance a legitimate governmental purpose: 
The marriage ban works a deep and scarring hardship on a 
very real segment of the community for no rational reason. 
The absence of any reasonable relationship between, on the 
one hand, an absolute disqualification of same-sex couples 
who wish to enter into civil marriage and, on the other, protec-
tion of public health, safety, or general welfare, suggests that 
the marriage restriction is rooted in persistent prejudices 
against persons who are (or who are believed to be) homosex-
ual. “The Constitution cannot control such prejudices but nei-
ther can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the 
reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give 
them effect.”155 
Thus, were something like the MFI initiative ever to succeed in Massa-
chusetts, one dispositive inquiry in the inevitable equal protection chal-
lenge—whether a rational basis underlies the measure—would have to 
be answered, as a matter of state constitutional law, have to be answered 
with a resounding “No!”156 
 The prospects for success in states other than Massachusetts are 
vastly more difficult to predict and depend, for the most part, upon 
what standard of review is selected by the courts.157 At present, only 
                                                                                                                      
155 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)). 
In a remark that will doubtless cause him much difficulty in the future, Justice Scalia effec-
tively concedes that bans on same-sex marriage are based solely upon “persistent preju-
dices” of the kind condemned by the Massachusetts court: “If moral disapprobation of 
homosexual conduct is ‘no legitimate state interest’ for purposes of proscribing that con-
duct, . . . what justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to 
homosexual couples? Surely not the encouragement of procreation, since the sterile and 
the elderly are allowed to marry.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604–05 (2003) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
156 See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968; see also Schulman, 850 N.E.2d at 512 (Greaney, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he Goodridge decision may be irreversible because of its holding that no 
rational basis exists, or can be advanced, to support the definition of marriage proposed by 
the initiative and the fact that the Goodridge holding has become part of the fabric of the 
equality and liberty guarantees of our Constitution.”); Opinions of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 
570 (“For no rational reason the marriage laws of [Massachusetts] discriminate against a 
defined class; no amount of tinkering with language will eradicate that stain.”). Further, 
strong evidence that civil rights and liberties were not intended to be among the permissi-
ble subjects of an initiative petition makes the MFI amendment and its ilk even less likely 
to survive judicial scrutiny. See Mass. Const. amend. art. XLVIII, Init., pt. II, § 2 (barring 
initiatives that impede, among other rights, “access to and protection in courts of justice”). 
157 See Schulman, 850 N.E.2d at 513 n.3 (Greaney, J., concurring). 
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Massachusetts law expressly holds that no legitimate state interest is ad-
vanced by denying same-sex couples access to civil marriage.158 Other 
state courts, even in relatively progressive jurisdictions, have shown 
themselves to be more inclined to invent hypothetical “legitimate” gov-
ernmental interests to be “rationally” advanced by the exclusion.159 
Thus, to the extent that courts continue to apply the rational basis test 
to discrimination against gays and lesbians, there may be little success 
in voiding the numerous constitutional amendments that now obstruct 
access to civil marriage for same-sex couples.160 
 Recent developments in constitutional jurisprudence do, however, 
provide much cause for optimism.161 In 2003, the Supreme Court de-
clared anti-sodomy laws unconstitutional in the landmark case of Law-
rence v. Texas.162 In doing so, the Court subjected Texas’s anti-sodomy 
law to a conspicuously more stringent analysis than the “rational basis” 
test normally entails, all the while avoiding any express indication of 
what level of scrutiny had been applied.163 Many scholars therefore be-
lieve that Lawrence signifies an intention to return to defining “funda-
mental rights” (i.e., those of constitutional import) broadly and ab-
stractly rather than narrowly and by rigid enumeration.164 If this 
understanding is correct, then the outrageous practice of sanctioning 
discrimination against gay and lesbian citizens so long as there is an 
asserted “rational basis” finally will cease and the prospects for invalidat-
ing anti-gay and anti-family “defense of marriage” amendments will be 
much enhanced.165 
                                                                                                                      
158 See Task Force, Marriage Map, supra note 14; Jenkins, supra note 14. 
159 See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 222 (N.J. 2006); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 
1, 7 (N.Y. 2006). 
160 See Lewis, 908 A.2d at 222; Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7. 
161 See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
162 Id. at 578. 
163 Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak 
Its Name, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1893, 1916, 1917 (2004). 
164 See id. at 1904, 1934. 
165 See id. at 1939, 1940 & n.181. 
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